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IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE that Judge Frank regarded his analysis of the disturbing
role of "Fact Finding" in the judicial process and his assault on the popular
myth of certainty in the law as his most important contributions to a realistic
study of law in action. Calling himself a fact skeptic rather than a rule
skeptic and devoting much of his interest to the vitally important role of
trial courts, he never tired of emphasizing the impossibility of attaining a
high degree of predictability with regard to judicial behavior due to the
elusiveness of fact finding. "No matter how precise or definite . . . the
formal legal rules," to quote his language, "no matter what the discoverable
uniformities behind these formal rules, nevertheless it is impossible, and will
always be impossible, because of the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions
turn, to predict future decisions in most (not all) lawsuits, not yet begun
or not yet tried."1
However important this aspect of his work, I would like to take the
opportunity to speak briefly of a related contribution-his psychological
realism. Typical of his approach is his discussion of the myth of certainty.
By lending strength to our sense of security, as he argued, "an unquestioning
deiendence upon authority" brings with it a great degree of emotional satis-
faction. Small wonder that, "in the absence of trustworthy human authorities,
fictitious authorities are invented," taking frequently the form of absolute
principles. This understandable human attitude, according to Judge Frank,
explains the profound and widespread belief in a harmonious and definitive
body of law behind the law of statutes and decisions, binding on legislators
and judges alike. It has only to be discovered.2
The parts of his most famous book devoted to a psychoanalytical approach
to law have remained the most controversial. Despite the intense criticism
encountered by some of Judge Frank's challenging observations, he was
justified, I submit, in his conviction that a psychological approach gives to
law and to its study a new and indispensable dimension. To be sure, juris-
prudence, during most of its long history, did not forget that the validity
of rules of law cannot be based on obedience alone; they have to be anchored
in the sense of justice of the members of the community. Legal as well as
1. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, Preface ix (1949).
2. STEPHENSON, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 92 (1944).
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other social institutions must be in harmony with what those who live under
them think to be moral.3 But we should not conceal the disquieting fact
that due to the enormous role played- by emotional, i.e., irrational factors,
the law we live under is far from the ideal of being "dispassionate reason."
Until recently, attempts at analyzing and understanding the sense of
justice-so vitally important for stability as well as progres--have been
neglected, at least in this country.4 Recent studies have shown, as
he claimed, that our sense of justice is a name for a bundle of demands on
society which are in a never-ending conflict with one another. In the name
of justice, as has been pointed out, demands for "arithmetical" as well as
for "geometrical" equality, for the protection of the status quo, as well as
respect for one's individuality and liberty, have been made. We all must
go through the slow and painful process of learning that justice cannot
always mean arithmetical equality or the protection of the status quo. With
many members of society this important step in the direction of moral
maturity is never fully accomplished. 5 They are willing to forego the gratifi-
cation of their deep-seated demands only on condition that the other members
of the community will be forced to do the same. Disregard for this principle
within the body politic is often regarded as a miscarriage of justice, as breach
of an implied social contract, as has been aptly observed.0 A return to anti-
social attitudes is frequently the result. Furthermore, in the life of all of
us there arise situations where social and self-assertive instincts, prejudicial
and enlightened attitudes are in most precarious balance. These insights
are of the utmost importance for the administration of criminal justice and
our attitude with regard to the criminal. We are bound to realize that
society's role towards the criminal is frequently ambivalent to a disturbing
degree.7
A psychoanalytical approach is of invaluable help to a better under-
standing of natural law which Judge Frank took much more seriously than
some of his critics have been willing to concede. Natural law, in one of
its most important aspects, is a psychological phenomenon. Its emphasis
on the dual structure of law shows remarkable insight. Natural law philosophy
emphasizes the interdependence of two levels of reality. Law, as our external
experience tells us, is positive law; law, our inner experience demands, has
to conform to the idea of justice. To be sure, the law that is and the law
3. Knight, Ethics and Economic Reform, 6 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 1, 4 (1939).
4. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949); RiEZLER, DAS RECHTSGEF1UHL (2nd. ed.
1946).
5. BMNENFLD, THE RwiscovXY OF JUSTICE (1947).
6. ALEXANDER & STAUB, THELCRIMINAL, THE: JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 10 et seq. (1931).
7. Exssi.E, SEARCHLIGHT ON. DE.INQUENCY (1956).
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that ought to be have to be distinguished whenever possible, to avoid arbi-
trariness, but it is equally true, as natural law philosophy insists, that law
and the fundamental principles inherent in our moral tradition cannot
be separated. It is even meaningful to maintain, with Radbruch, that
positive law which violates fundamental notions of justice to an "intolerable
degree" is "lawless" law, so that-to mention only one of many implications
-resistance on the part of the members of the community is not merely
a moral duty.8
Still, natural law having emotional ingredients, it is not surprising that
conflicting values have been both defended and attacked in the name of
natural law.
Thus, however profound its insights and in spite of impressive contribu-
tions of natural law philosophy to the development of our legal orders, a
disquieting question remains: will not natural law be deprived of its vis
directiva if its adherents, playing their role of "ethical leaders,"9 when
attempting "to discern those minimum principles that must be accepted in
order to make law possible,"'u  are unwilling to listen to a realistic science
of human nature? Can natural law philosophy as at present oriented
rightly claim to be doing its part in the creation of those human conditions
which are required for the widespread development of a mature sense of
justice which is indispensable for a just social order? To achieve maturity
the opportunity of choice and therefore of making mistakes and of assuming
responsibility for their consequences is indispensable, as liberalism correctly
claims.
FRIEDRICH KESSLER
8. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
481 et seq. (1954).
9. J. Frank, dissenting in Repouille v. United States, 2d Cir. 1947, 165 F. 2d 152.
10. Fuller, supra, note 8 at 463.
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